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Question 
What are the key challenges to Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) when designing and 
delivering development interventions around transboundary issues? How have tools and 
concepts, including Political Economy Analysis, been adapted to overcome these challenges and 
what lessons have been learned? 
Contents 
1. Summary 
2. Thinking and Working Politically 
3. Challenges of TWP on transboundary issues 
4. Tools and concepts adapted for transboundary settings 
5. Lessons learned  
6. References  
 
  





There is growing consensus that political factors are a key determinant of development impact. 
The practice of Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) is built around three inter-connected 
principles: (i) strong political analysis, insight and understanding; (ii) detailed appreciation of, and 
response to, the local context; and (iii) flexibility and adaptability in program design and 
implementation. From the limited experience thus far of applying TWP on transboundary issues, 
the following challenges are apparent: 
1. The process becomes more complex as both the number of actors and the diversity of 
interests and incentives increase. 
2. There are variations in the political traction attached to different policy areas and the 
institutions responsible for them.  
3. Geo-political sensitivities shape the space for transboundary cooperation, which is 
therefore vulnerable to opening and closing unpredictably. 
4. There are differing interpretations of what is ‘regional’. Further, transboundary 
interventions are not always a response to a failure of collective action at that level. 
5. The governance of transboundary issues is likely to involve the interplay of 
multiple institutions operating at different levels. Practitioners must then navigate this 
complexity.  
Some of the lessons learned are as follows: 
1. While TWP emphasises the centrality of politics and power, technical knowledge is 
still important and can reinforce the political agenda, for example by increasing the 
confidence of smaller states or by strengthening collective understanding. 
2. Improving the quality of domestic cooperation can be a step towards regional 
cooperation. 
3. Flexible engagement with the diverse range of actors that populate transboundary 
settings has been shown to be an effective strategy. 
4. Transboundary cooperation can be built from the bottom up, either by focusing 
spatially or by working incrementally in modest steps. 
5. For development partners, pre-existing bilateral partnerships may facilitate their 
engagement at a transboundary level, particularly on sensitive issues. 
Given the relatively isolated experience of TWP in transboundary settings, the evidence base for 
this report is also limited. The two areas where most examples were found concern regional 
integration and transboundary water management. 
While there has been some work to advance TWP and gender, neither gender nor disability were 
features of the literature under review. 
 
 




2. Thinking and Working Politically 
There is growing consensus that the critical success factor in achieving developmental change is 
a deep understanding of, and active engagement with, local political and power relations (Laws & 
Marquette, 2018).1 The practice of Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) reflects this 
consensus and is guided by three core principles (Table 1). 
 
See: Table 1: Thinking and Working Politically: Principles and Characteristics, Source: TWP 
Community of Practice (nd), p. 2, https://twpcommunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/the-
case-for-thinking-and-working-politically.pdf  
 
Political economy analysis (PEA) underpins TWP by exploring the distribution and contestation of 
political and economic power and the implications of this for development (McGregor et al, 2020). 
PEA may be applied in different ways and at different levels of operation (Harris & Booth, 2013). 
Practitioners with the right skill-set can incorporate the insights from PEA into their ongoing work, 
thus connecting the two complementary elements (‘thinking’ and ‘working’) of TWP (McGregor et 
al, 2020). 
A recent evidence review of TWP (Dasandi et al, 2019; Laws & Marquette, 2018) finds that its 
literature has certain limitations, including in rigour and robustness, and in its capacity to 
demonstrate that TWP can deliver better development outcomes; the authors also note the lack 
of journal articles. The same evidence review indicates that most of the contexts in which TWP 
has been applied are country-based, even if programmes are designed or managed regionally. In 
2017, the TWP Community of Practice discussed how TWP might extend its scope to address 
‘larger and messier’ development challenges that cross national boundaries (TWP Community of 
Practice, 2017, p. 2). The two case studies presented at that meeting were on transboundary 
water management and regional integration, and these two issues provide most of the material in 
this report. The searches for this report, reinforced by consultation with members of the TWP 
Community of Practice, suggest that the application of TWP in transboundary settings is still 
limited. 
3. Challenges of TWP on transboundary issues 
1. The larger number of actors, each with their differing interests and incentives, 
makes the process of TWP more complex. Transboundary analysis is multi-layered: it 
needs to explore the political dynamics within each country, as well as those between 
countries, and the interaction between the two (Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2016). 
Transboundary dynamics also play out within countries, particularly over shared natural 
resources (Tincani et al, 2018). The multi-dimensional nature of transboundary issues 
brings in a wide range of actors and presents challenges for PEA, which risks being 
 
1 In their discussion of TWP and biodiversity, Schuttenberg et al (2020) note that ‘local’, when used in the context 
of TWP, does not imply working at a small geographical scale but rather distinguishes between local actors and 
outsiders. It does not rule out working on the larger scale that an ecosystem approach may require. 




overly general or unfocused unless the research question is tailored to the specific needs 
of the team at that time (World Bank, 2017). 
2. The political traction attached to different policy areas varies. In their synthesis of 
the findings from the Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations (PEDRO) 
programme, Byiers et al (2019) show that different cross-border issues, such as trade, 
security, energy, or ecosystem management, have different political imperatives that alter 
the incentives to engage across borders. For example, immediate threats carry greater 
political urgency than aspirational agendas focused on the creation of future benefits. 
Those sectors where country priorities are largely national or local in nature, such as 
water in Southern Africa, are unlikely to generate strong incentives for regional 
cooperation (Woolfrey & Muller, 2017).2 The power of sector ministries also varies: Wells-
Dang et al (2016), reviewing the political economy of environmental impact assessments 
in the Mekong region, note the limited influence and authority of environment ministries, 
and the risk that generous donor support may isolate them still further from the more 
influential parts of government. 
3. The space for transboundary cooperation is politically sensitive, shaped by 
geopolitical priorities, and can open and close unpredictably. ‘Resource 
nationalism’, in which cross-border cooperation over natural resources is determined by 
wider geo-political considerations, is a particular challenge; Stanbury-Davis (2018) 
discusses how governments in Asia regard rivers as both national assets and tools for 
managing their external affairs. Unrelated political events can stall progress on collective 
action (Tincani et al, 2018). 
4. There are differing interpretations of what is ‘regional’, or transboundary. Regions 
exist on a variety of spatial scales and levels which may be understood differently by 
different actors, and which may overlap with each other or function in parallel. The range 
of a regional or transboundary issue and the mechanism intended to manage it may not 
coincide; an eco-region and a political region, for example, may in practice occupy 
separate geographical spaces (Söderbaum & Granit, 2014).3 
Further, the added value of transboundary action is not always apparent; nor does it 
necessarily drive regional cooperation. Byiers et al (2019) find that not all activities 
carried out by regional organisations are responses to a failure of collective action at the 
regional level; many appear to be projects that happen to be implemented by a regional 
organisation in more than one country. 
5. The governance of transboundary issues is likely to involve the complex interplay 
of multiple institutions operating at different levels. This may be a consequence of 
asymmetries in governance at the national level. For example, since water governance in 
India is a state-level function, transboundary discussions are influenced by the political 
dynamics within India’s basin states, which are themselves also key actors in those 
 
2 Woolfrey & Muller (2017) also attribute the lack of regional traction to a divergence between the priorities of 
national governments and development partners. The water priorities of member states of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) are largely driven by their national development concerns, such as energy 
generation and economic development, rather than the conservation and environmental agenda favoured by 
development partners. 
3 The authors list six types of region: (i) eco-region, (ii) cultural region, (iii) economic region, (iv) administrative 
region, (v) political region, and (vi) security region. 




interactions, thus complicating the process of international negotiation (Stanbury-Davis, 
2018). 
There may be multiple overlapping frameworks of decision-making and cooperation with 
responsibility for the same resource. These are two examples: 
i. Jensen & Lange (2013) categorise the various forms of water governance in the 
Mekong and Zambezi river basins: (i) unilateral water development interventions 
by a single country that affect the basin; (ii) bilateral cooperation agreements 
governing specific projects in the basin; (iii) bilateral water agreements between 
riparian countries and basin water commissions; (iv) multilateral water 
agreements between three or more countries; and (v) regional cooperative 
frameworks, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
ii. Knaepen & Byiers (2017) explore the institutional arrangements in the Nile Basin. 
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is an intergovernmental partnership of ten Nile 
Basin countries to promote collaboration and benefit-sharing. Most are also 
members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which is also 
developing a regional water strategy. Other actors involved in managing Nile 
waters include the Lake Victoria Basin Commission under the East African 
Community (EAC), and the East Africa Power Pool under the Community of East 
and Southern Africa. 
It should also be noted that authority is exercised, and regional cooperation may be 
pursued, through informal as well as formal mechanisms such as those listed above, and 
by private as well as public actors, further adding to the institutional complexity (Byiers et 
al, 2019; Söderbaum & Granit, 2014). 
4. Tools and concepts adapted for transboundary settings 
Given the limited body of literature on transboundary TWP, it was not possible to identify a wide 
number of tools and concepts adapted to this context. However, two are summarised here: the 
first from the literature on regional integration and the second from the literature on 
transboundary water management. 
Five-lens tool 
The PEDRO research programme sampled and adapted PEA frameworks and tools commonly 
used at country and sector level to inform the development of a ‘five lens’ framework for 
analysing the political economy of regional cooperation (Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2016). The five 
lenses interact with each other and are as follows: 
1. Structural or foundational factors 
2. Formal and informal institutions / rules of the game 
3. Actors, agency and incentives 
4. (Sub)-sector-specific technical and political characteristics 
5. External or exogenous factors. 




The authors note that this approach is broadly in line with the TWP agenda, in that political 
analysis and contextual understanding should inform programming that is flexible and adaptable 
in design. To that end, Byiers & Vanheukelom (2016) present five options that can guide 
decisions about a programme’s level of ambition, which reflect what is politically feasible and will 
work ‘with the grain’, rather than from a normative template. The five options, with their key 
guiding questions, are: 
1. Alter: Given the context laid out using the five lenses, what are the chances of being 
able to alter the interests of key stakeholder groups and actors? 
2. Adapt: To what degree can objectives be met, or can ‘the problem’ be addressed 
building on existing incentives and informal practices? 
3. Avoid: What are the prospects, but also the potential costs and benefits of working 
through alternative and/or parallel processes and institutional forms? 
4. Await: Are there some potentially important political or other game changers on the 
horizon that might offer better opportunities for reform? 
5. Abandon: Assuming none of the other 4 A’s apply, is abandoning the intervention or 
reform politically feasible or desirable, and might any negative effects otherwise be 
offset? 
Perceived risks to cooperation 
The Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) initiative has published guidance on 
PEA for transboundary water management (World Bank, 2017). This takes a problem-driven 
approach to PEA, the five steps in the analysis being (i) problem definition, (ii) context, (iii) 
institutional arrangements, (iv) underlying drivers, and (v) ‘what can be done?’ 
In exploring steps 3 and 4 (institutions and drivers) the guidance recommends a tool that 
analyses countries’ perceived risks to cooperation and helps draw out underlying concerns and 
priorities. The risks are clustered in five areas and defined as follows (World Bank, 2017, p. 9): 
1. Capacity and knowledge: Confidence in the ability to negotiate a fair deal; having 
adequate and correct information and knowledge to negotiate a deal. 
2. Accountability and voice: Deliverability of benefits by the regional entity and co-
riparians, often related to trust; having a say in decision making in the governing 
structures of the regional entity. 
3. Sovereignty and autonomy: Ability to act in the best interest of the country without 
constraints; making decisions independently. 
4. Equity and access: Fairness of (relative) benefits to a country, including timing of 
benefits and costs and obtaining/retaining fair access to the river. 
5. Stability and support: Potential longevity of the agreement; in-country support of the 
agreement, including likelihood of ratification. 
Other frameworks 
The searches for this report identified a number of other frameworks and analytical lenses which, 
while they may not be explicitly associated with TWP, nevertheless recognise the centrality of 
politics and power, the limitations of technocratic approaches, and the need to adapt to 




complexity and uncertainty. There was insufficient time to explore these in any depth given the 
size of the literature, but two may be relevant: 
1. Water Diplomacy Framework: this is presented as an alternative to technically focused 
water management approaches (Islam & Repella, 2015). It starts by exploring the values 
and interests of stakeholders, acknowledging the need to incorporate diverse viewpoints. 
It then seeks ‘politically legitimate and tentative prescriptions’ given the high levels of 
both complexity and uncertainty. The authors comment: ‘Our challenge is how to 
translate solutions that emerge from science and technology into the messy context of 
the economy and politics’ (Islam & Repella, 2015, p. 1). 
2. Political ecology analysis: this is an interdisciplinary approach to understanding 
environmental processes that incorporates some aspects of political economy. Nash 
(2020) argues that it can reinforce efforts to think and work politically in the area of 
conservation and natural resource management, for example by understanding how 
uneven power relations influence corruption. 
5. Lessons learned 
1. While TWP emphasises the centrality of politics and power, technical knowledge is 
still important and can reinforce the political agenda. For example: 
a. Strengthening technical competence can help to level the transboundary 
playing field. An evaluation of the South Asia Water Initiative found that smaller 
countries in the region felt more confident negotiating with their larger and more 
powerful neighbours once they had a clearer technical understanding of the 
issues (Tincani et al, 2018). 
b. Technical collaboration and trust-building can build shared understanding 
of the regional challenges faced. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) enhanced its 
legitimacy with member states by positioning itself as a knowledge broker, 
developing an analytical and modelling tool that facilitates shared understanding 
of river behaviour and the likely impact of different intervention scenarios 
(Medinilla, 2018). The NBI works in an adaptive manner in a complex political 
environment, using its technical services to strengthen political relations 
(Knaepen & Byiers, 2017). Empowering a regional institution to provide technical 
knowledge services may in some cases be less politically sensitive than starting 
from more ambitious regional agendas (Medinilla, 2018). 
2. Improving the quality of domestic cooperation can be a step towards regional 
cooperation. The South Asia Water Initiative evaluation found that reducing the 
communication gaps between national ministries (such as those responsible for finance, 
external affairs, energy, and water) was an important first step towards achieving the 
cohesive approach necessary for regional cooperation to work (Tincani et al, 2018). 
3. Flexible engagement with a diverse range of actors is an effective strategy. Many 
different actors may be trying to influence decision-making on transboundary issues, 
such as civil society organisations, the private sector, the media, and researchers, as 
well as various public bodies. In such a crowded space, experience from the Mekong 
region suggests that the organisations and networks which are particularly effective in 




facilitating dialogue on politically sensitive issues are those that have invested in their 
relationships with many of these different players (TWP Community of Practice, 2017). 
4. Transboundary cooperation can be built from the bottom up. Sub-regional 
cooperation may be more politically feasible, since the smaller number of countries 
involved increases the chance that their interests may align. There are several examples 
of this: 
a. The corridor approach to trade and industrialisation adopted by some regional 
bodies such as SADC and the EAC (Byiers et al, 2019). 
b. A spatial approach based around specific natural resources, such as the 
different sub-groups and investment programmes associated with different parts 
of the Nile waters (Medinilla, 2018). 
c. The Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa, where strong 
cross-border collaboration at the local level is identified as being key to their 
successful implementation. Moreover, the political stakes were kept relatively low 
(Bertelsmann-Scott, 2013). The process of developing these areas proceeded in 
small steps which did not significantly challenge national sovereignty 
(Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016). 
5. Transboundary cooperation can also be politically sensitive and take time. In these 
circumstances, building the necessary trust is a slow process that is vulnerable to being 
reversed. It is therefore important to identify what each programme has achieved, as well 
as what remains to be done, so that the wider sector can sustain momentum over the 
longer term (Tincani et al, 2018). 
6. For development partners, pre-existing bilateral partnerships may facilitate their 
engagement at a transboundary level. An evaluation of the approach to policy dialogue 
used in the Greater Mekong Water Resources Program by Australia’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) noted that DFAT’s involvement in difficult 
transboundary issues was made relatively easier by it being already recognised as a 
partner in each country (Pech & Mather, 2017). 
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